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NATO EXPANSION DURING THE COLD WAR AND AFTER Evan Jaroff
N ATO has unde rgon e five ro u nds of e nla rge m e n t sin ce its incepti on in 194 <), a nd it is poised to u nde rgo anoth er ro und q uite shortly , since Albania and C ro atia sig ne d accessio n protocols in 200tl. In ord er to und erstand future expa nsio ns , in clu ding th e proj ected entry of Alban ia and C ro atia, it is h elpful to examine th e history of N ATO e nlargeme nt, and in parti cular th e c rite ri a used to id enti fy potential n ew me m b e rs and th e p rocess that they must under go in o rd e r to j oin th e Allian ce . This pa per demo nstrates th at ac cessio n criter ia used during th e Cold War, altho ug h ne ver ex plici tly o u tline d , we re quite sim ila r to th e suggeste d criteri a laid o ut in ;1 1995 rep ort (Stu d y on E nlarge me nt ) that w as used to eva luate potential new m ember states for th e accessio ns of 19<) () and 2004. H o w e ver , afte r th e Cold W ar th e actual process o f accession b ecame more stru ctu red , regulated , and stringen t. U nd er stand ing N ATO ex pa nsio n In th e past w ill help she d so me light on how new member states co uld be admitted in th e future .
NATO's FOUNDING MEMBER STATES
Issu es o f NATO ex pansio n aro se ev e n before access io n talks w ith Greece and Turke y in 1<)52, sinc e the first real in stance of enla rgem ent o ccu rred after th e " W ashingt on Exp lo rato ry T alks o n Sec urity" (W ET ) , which w ere nego tiatio ns (held betw ee n 1<)48 an d 1949) leadi ng up to NATO 's fo un di ng .
1 Th ese n egoti ati ons prod uced th e "Washin gt on Pa pe r" (in Se p te m be r 194 tl). whi ch di scu ssed th e states th at wo uld be in cl ude d ,IS fou ndin g m einbel'S o f th e N o rth A tlant ic Treaty Orga niz atio n ." It laid o ut three g ro ups o f co untries a nd dubbed t hem the " har d co re, th e ste pp ing sto nes, and th e go ats" (Smith 26 ) . The United States, Ca nada, the United Kin gdom, France, the Netherl an ds, Belgiu lll . and Luxe m bo urg made up th e hard co re states, which " share d co m m o n st rat egic and id eological co nce rns , an d w o uld fo rm a close assoc iatio n that w ou ld be at the h eart o f the North Atl anti c Treaty" (Sm it h 26) . N orw ay, D en ma rk , Icelan d, Ireland, and Po rt ugal w e re th e stepp ing stones states, w hose geogr'lp hic locations nude th em o f strategic , mil itar y impo rtance. T he fin al gro up , th e goats, w as co m prised o f Italy, Turk ey, and G reece. No ne o f th ese three state s "fit th e te rm "North Atla nt ic' III it s ge ograp hic al or str ategi c articu latio ns, o r (in th e G ree k NATO Expansion During the Cold War and After an d Turkish cases) its id eol ogical o nes, but w er e noneth eless of key im po rtance to W este rn Eu rope" (Smith 27) .
ITALY'S INCLUSION IN NATO
Ital y' s in clusion as a founding m ember of NATO is a particularl y interesting e lse , sin ce it was "the clear est de pa rt u re from the geograph ical co nce pt of th e N orth Atl antic Tre.rry, and th us is clear ev ide nce of th e political cr ite ria for m embership " (Sm ith 57 ). Wh en th e "hard co re " stat es de liber ated ove r wh ich " o t he r" or "add itio na l" stares to includ e in NATO , th ey did not have clear cr ite ria to gu ide th eir e valuatio n (Sm ith 29) . This w as q ui te e vide nt in Italy' s case, whi ch was largely acce pted becau se of Ro m e 's stro ng desire to j o in NAT O , and in flu eutial Fren ch support. T he italian s~rgued th at " Italy wa s, by d in t o f 'he r civili sat ion and h e r mercantile and m arit im e traditio ns' a W este rn Eu ro pean co untry" (Smith 30) . However, th e US an d UK worri ed that in co rporating Italy Into NATO coul d lead to an ove rex te nsio n o f th eir military ca pab iliti es if th e lt alian s neede d mili tar y assistanc e . Althou gh thi s w as a valid co nce rn , it feU to the back gr ound as th e Fren ch backed Ital y ill part becau se including the stat e in NATO w o uld make it more d ifficu lt to excl ude Algeri a (the n a Fr en ch col ony) from th e o rganizatio n 111 the future (Smi th 35) . Th e French m ad e it cle ar th at th ey stro ngly suppo rte d Ital y's cause, and w he n th e Italian ambassad or sign aled Italy 's desire fo r N AT O m embe rshi p to th e U S State De part me nt , it w as a big ste p toward s its eventu al inclusi on .
By d irectl y appealin g to th e United States , ltal y ackn o w ledged Washi ngton 's ke y rol e in th e acc essio n decision . Italy was " heavily dependen t o n th e U S fo r aid in its post-w ar reconstru cti on " an d felt th at j o inin g N ATO wo uld help en sur e th at U S-Itali~n rela tio ns remained frie ndly (Sm ith 37 ). Italy would also ec on omi cally be nefit fro m close r relat io ns w it h other NATO m ember states, usin g th e US as a sp ringb o ard. Italy placed th e Am eri can s in a rather peril ous positio n by giving th e U S th e final d ecision in th eir accession . If th e U S ch ose to exclude Italy, then it w o u ld not o n ly co u nter stro ng Fren ch suppo rt , but it also ran the risk of sett ing a p re cede n t for which co unt ries wou ld b e deni ed in th e fut ure . M oreo ve r, ex clud ing Italy cou ld h ave swayed the coun try to sid e w it h th e Sov iet Uni on in the future, so me thing that nei th er th e U S nor W estern Eu rope wan te d to happ en . Ul timately , th e U S recomm ended th at Italy join N AT O based o n a relati ve conse nsus am ong th e " hard core" states, th e formal Italian requ est to join th e o rgan izat io n , and th e po ssibl e geopo litica l conseq ue nce s of rejecti ng a state .
The co nseq ue nces of rej ecting a state's bid to j oin NATO were taken ve ry se rio usly during th e Cold W ar , whi ch helps explai n w hy th er e is no evi de nce of un successful applicati ons for en try into NATO during this perio d. As allud ed to w ith respect to Italy, th e conseq ue nces of an un su ccessfu l, d elayed , or w ithd raw n appli cation co uld threaten the o rganiza tio n's vitality. G eorge Kennan . a m ember of th e State Depa rtme nt tha t negoti ated the N orth Atlan tic T reaty, po ints o ut that if" ind ivid udl co un tries rejecte d m embership o r were refused m emb ership, th e Russians co uld make political cap ital out of thi s, eith er way" (Sm ith 23) . 1n ot he r words, NA T O no t o nly had to be careful abo u t dealin g with stat es that ac tive ly so ug h t NATO m embership du ring th e Cold Wa r, but it also had to be parti cular about inviting states to join th e Alliance so that the o rga nizatio n w ould not b e em ba rrassed by a rej ectio n . Alth ough this article mentions th at the membe r states must un animou sly ag re e to invit e p otential states to become NATO members, it d oes not outline sp ecific cr it eria upon which to base suc h in vit ati ons. Du e to its vagueness. d iplomats and sc ho lars d eb at ed what th e c rite ria fo r a pe rsp ective NATO m ember stare sho uld be . Kennan ar gu ed th at NATO membe rship sho u ld be ex te nded o nly to co u n tr ies " w ho se sho res w er e wa sh ed by th e waters o f th e North Atl anti c" (quoted in Sm ith 23) . Sc ho lar Mark Sm ith notes th at Kennan 's criteri a, based purely o n geo g raph y, wo u ld have th e advantages of "(a) being clea rly a defen si ve pact and th er efore not likel y to pr o vok e rh e So viet Uni on into a sort of co m p etitio n for a llies: and (h) po ssessin g so lid ly d elin eated m embe rship cri te ria a nd th er efore not su bject to grey ar eas" (23) . H o w ever , as ev ide nc ed b y Ital y's inclusio n in NATO (a nd rhe later accessi on o f Greece and Turkey), K ennan's geographical criteria w ere not ad opted as th e basis for NATO expansion during th e Cold War. In o rde r to better und erstand th e process and criteri a used to de tcrmine NATO m ember stares during rhi s e ra, ir is helpful to o bse rv e th e accessio n o f Gree ce and Turkey in 1952.
THE ACCESSION OF GREECE AND TURKEY (1952)
Foll owing W o rld War II, Turkey underw ent a period o f modernization and \V esrernizati on , underl in ed by C ol d W ar politics th at placed grea ter Importance o n alliances and allegia nces, rat he r than neutral ism . Turkey so ug ht NATO m embe rsh ip nor only for th e se cu rity gua rallt ee artic ulate d und er Arr icle 5 o f th e N orth Arlanric Trea ty , but also ro gJiu closer tics ro th e United St at es and \Vesrern Eu rope. " Greece, howe ver, srrugg led afie r WWIl from th e catastro p hic dama ge wroughr by the civil w ar that occurred from 194 ()-194 9 (Sm it h 57 ). Th e Truman D o ctrin e, w h ic h so ug ht ro limit th e spread o f Con u mu u sm , pr o vided Gree ce w irh co nside rab le finan cial and political aid . Th e threat o f Co mm un ism pr op agat ed the n otion that NATO ne eded ro w ide n irs sco pe and better sec u re th e territo ry und er irsjurisdicri on (Smi t h HH). Base d OIl thi s idea, the Un ired States argu ed that " G reece an d Turkey need ed ro he defended and rightly linked ro th e weste rn fold , and rhi s carn e to m ean that rh e y need ed to be inilitaril» prote ct ed" (Sm irh ( 5) .
The United Stares W ;IS th e main proponent for both Turk ish and Gree k accessio n . G ree ce and Tu rke y w e re imp ortant ro th e U S because of rh eir link to rh e Eastern M edire rran can , the Middle East, and o il (Sm ith ( 7) . Th e U S had strategic in terests in both " e nsu rin g that the Greek milirary could maintain an internal ord er hlvo llr. ble to th e West; an d .. . m aintaining rh e ca pa bility of th e Turkish m ilirury to resist Sovie t political pressure and possible milira ry arrack " (Sm irh (7) . Al so , th e Unired Sta tes saw ex te nd in g NATO membershi p
to Greece and Turke y as ,I ben efit , because " if Greece and /o r Turkey o pred for neutralism (m o re lik ely in Turkey's case) , o r we re so m e ho w dra wn into th e Soviet sp he re (mo re lik ely IJ1 Gr eece' s case) , this could pot entially he the beginnin g of a spread in g tend en cy In the Mediterran ean ,Ind Middle Ea st" (Sm it h (3). As th e grea test supporter of enlargem en t, th e U S also played a key role m L cilitat in g, and influ en cin g, Turkish and C reek accession.
The Creek and Turkish accessions were de cid ed at a fu ll uunisre rial m eeting of the N orth Atlanti c Co un cil (N AC) b y a co nsensus vote. H owever, before thi s m eetin g took place, a gre,lt deal of co nversatio n occ ur red w ithin th e C o u nc il of Deput ies and th e Standing Croup, ' The C o u ncil of D eputi es w as " the pl'lll1<lry co nd u it throu gh w h ich dipl omats voiced th e positi on s of their gov erruu cnts, hut also throu gh which th e w eigh t o f intraAlliance o pinio n co uld be br ou ght h orne to governm ents themselves " (Sm ith 75). The Stand ing Gro u p, co m prised o f th e United States, Fran ce, and Crear Britain , "exercised almost so le dcfar,» responsibili ty for th e fo rma tio n o f NATO strate gy " until th e establishn ienr of Sup rem e Headquarters Alli ed P owers, Europe (SH A PE) in 195 1 (Sm ith 75). Th e Standing C ro u p w ielded innn en se p o we r, since other " NATO m embers w ould he relu ctant to block a Joint position by th e U S, Britain and Fran ce, and the refore ... co nse nsus-b n ild ing would likely begin with thes e three" (Smith 75) . As "NATO's definiti ve m ember, " U S decisions held th e most wei ght in m eetings within NAT O and the Standin g C ro up (Smith R9) . Ultimately, th e accession of T u rk ey and Gr eece carn e down to th e Am eri can decision to support th ei r e nt ry. E ven th ough th e B riti sh w ere ini tiall y againsr Turki sh and Creek admi ssion , Am erican backing m ad e th em change th ei r position , whi ch in turn influen ced other m em ber states to agr ee to th e accession in 1952 .0
THE ACCESSION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1955)
Mu ch o f th e debate su rro u nd ing the acc ession of the FRC arose from uncertainty abo u t ho w to solve th e " G erm an Question ." E ssentially, European powers were unsure how to incorporate Cermany in to the internati on al co u n u u ni ty after W orld War II. In the past, C erma n y " had been to o po w erful to easily fit int o th e Europ ean system , hut n ot powerful eno u gh to dominate the system by hegem oni c o ve rlay" (Sm ith 121) . NATO member states were hesitant to allow for German rearm am ent, but under th e o rganizatio n 's new forward strategy, adopted in 1950, a Cenuau military force w ou ld be alm ost essential . G erman y's strategic case for ac cessio n was based 0 11 thi s strategy , whi ch called for defending " E u ro pe as [ It to the East as possible , and no furth er \X/est than th e Rhin e River" (Smith 103) . T he refo re , including a mil itaril y defensi ble FR C in NATO w as vital, since the "forwa rd strategy wo uld be geograph ically and materi ally un w orkable wi tho ut Ce rm an ni eu ibersh ip and co ntrib utio n " (Sm it h 124 ).
AJon g with its strat egi c im portance. th e FR C 's m ember ship in NATO w o uld be <I n exten sion o f Chancellor Ad eu au er's policy of W csrern ization. Ad cnau er fel t that the o nl y way "G er m any could re -establi sh itself as a legitimat e actor and recon cile old enmiti es W J S to be ' the m ost European nati on among Europ ean s.' ''7 Adcnauer saw NATO membership as a key to Ge rm any's successful inco rpo ratio n (in Europ e) and reh abilitati on (post-WWlI ), sinc e it wo uld be ,I " clear sign o f its Western vo catio n and . .. a cru cial part o f Adenau ers p olicy o f em be ddi ng the Fed eral R epubli c into th e emerg ing politico-econ omic blo c in \X/est Europ e " (Smi th 125). Th e U nit ed States wa s w ell ,1w are of th e strategic sign ificance (both militarily and politically) o f in cluding the FRC in NATO, and it w as up to the Ameri can s again to garn e r support for thi s cnlargcmcur.
Th e pr o cess of C e1111an acc essio n W<l S m or e com pli cated and drawn out than th e accessio n of Greece and Tu rke y, since th e US faced st ro ng Fren ch resistance early on . E arly http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/7 m eet in gs o f th e NAC saw N ATO m embers pu shing for t w o different st rateg ies. S om e allies favored " t he e n ticing prosp e ct o f forwa rd d efe nce w ith an in crea sed US military presence
In Europe" while others fear ed "a co rresp o ndi ng de m and for markedl y in creased Europe an defence spe n d ing; and th e lo oming prospect of Cerm an rearmam ent " (Smith [(4) . Th e Fr ench p rop o sed th e Pl ev en P lan as an alternative ; thi s called for th e c reatio n of a Eu ropean Defence Con n n u n iry (E DC) w it h ;1 European arluy comprised o f b oth French and C e riu an tro ops, co n tro lled b y a European Defen ce Minister (Sm it h 1( 7) . T he French su pp o rt ed this plan be cau se it to ok po w er aw ay from an ind e pe nde n t German milirary, w h ic h wo u ld prevent the p ossibility of armed G erm an aggression ag ain st th e Fren ch in th e futur e .
After t h e failure of th e Pl evcn Plan, Pr esid ent Truman tri ed to sw ay th e A lli es in tIVor o f G erm an accessio n b y p ointin g o u t the importance of Ccnuan co n t rib u tio n s to NATO's forward st rategy . Truman proclaim ed , " A n y m ap w ill sh o w it , and a little ar ithm etic will pro ve w ha t th e additi on o f Ce rm an manpower m eans to th e stre ngt h o f th e j oint d efence of Europe " (q u o te d in Smi t h 105). The US also sw ayed NAT O m embers by d eru oustrating the organizati on's utility ill answ e ring th e " G erman Quest ion ." By jo ini ng NATO , " G e rmany's military power w ould he c1/!/l/llc/crf through the multilateral apparat us o f S H A PE, hut it w o u ld also be su bo rd ina te d to th e p o w er o f the US" (Smi th 121-122). T h e French propo sed EDC did n ot ha ve th e sallie m e.ius of managing Ge rm an strength , w h ic h was a rea son w hy the NATO m e mbers decided to include G erman y ill th e o rga n iza t io n in 1955 .Ã lso, w he n th e Fren ch Parliam ent tliled to ra t ify the EDC Treat y , the m ember state s threw their support behind G ermany' s entry into NATO.
THE ACCESSION OF SPAIN (1982)
Spa in 's late accession into NATO w as lar g ely du e to its p olitical hi sto ry under Francis co Franco , w ho rul ed fr om 1936 until 1975. Spa in wa s " clea rly a Western European state in ge o graphi cal and hi stori ca l terms," but its tumultu ous re lat io ns h ip with its n ei ghbors, due t o th e nature of Fran co' s regime, "pre vented Spain fro m b ecoming p oliti call y accepted by th e rest o f Western Europe" (Smith 127 ). Again, alth ou gh the "British, Fr en ch and U S militari es (th e three k ey pl ayers in earl v NATO strategi c planning) were p arti cularly keen for Spa in to be admitted as a military nc cessit y].]" Franc o's di ctatorship act ed as an obstacl e to its e n try (S m it h 130) . H o w e ver, durin g Fran co 's rei gn , Spa in be cam e mi litaril y align ed with th e U ni ted States th rou gh the Mad rid Pacts , w hic h pa ved th e wa y for e ve nt ua l Spanish accession afte r the country 's transition to dem ocracy.
Sp ain an d the United States agreed to the Madrid Pact s in 1953 , w hi c h " w ere in essen ce an exch ang e : Spai n o b tain ed eco n o mic aid 111 exc ha nge for allowing the US to use na val and air bases 0 11 Spa n ish so il" (S m it h 13 1). Th e U S u sed these agr eem ents to "secure Spain as a st rate g ic p oint in th e C old W ar via bilateralismj .] " but o t h e r than eco n o m ic su pport, Spa in recei ved n o sec u ri ty g u ara ntee (Sm ith 131). Fundamentall y, Spa in w as part o f the N orth Atlantic military system, but it w as not a m emb er of NATO . Sp ain cont in u ed to st re ngthe n its ties with NATO and th e rest of Europe over the next twenty-five years , since " t he fac iJit ies it granted Iunder th e Madrid Pacts] h ad become an integral part of NAT O st rategy and war planning .. . [and] Spain 's o w n nav y an d ai r force w er e ... in creasingly ali gn ed w it h th os e o f th e Alli an ce in terms of pro cedure , st ructure , and e ven lan guage" (Sm i t h 13 5). Th erefore, Spani sh acce ssio n wa s not h eavil y ba sed o n NATO strat egy to increase its reach or military capabiliti es, sin ce it alr eady achieved thi s throu gh the M ad rid Pa ct s. In stead , th e ke y to Sp ain ' s accessi on was the gov ernment's demo crati c transition afte r Franco's d eath in O nce Spain b ecam e a dem ocracy, the U S and o ther NATO member state s had littl e tr ouble j ustifying it s entry into tile organ izatio n . O u ting t he 1' -)70, an d esp eci ally th e 1'-)8 0s , Eu ropea n govern m cll ts began fo c using on fost e ri ng g reate r co hesio n and co o pe ratio n ,llllo ng th eir ne ig hb ors, based o n a fo und ation of sha re d values (like demo c rac y), throu gh m em be rshi p ill in sti tuti o ns like th e Europea n E con o m ic Com m u nity and NATO ." M embe rshi p in th ese tw o o rga nizatio n s went almost h and in hand , and Spa in so u gh t acc e ptanc e into bo th as a means o f fittin g in ro th e Eu ro p ean co u uu u uiry after decad es u nd er Fran co 's re pr essive rul e. J o in ing NATO w o uld help Spain beco m e closer to Europe , and hel p un ite E uro pe . Howe ve r, th ere W ,IS so m e d isagreem e nt wit hin t he Spa n ish state b y so c ialists and co ru ru unists who felt that j o ining NATO wo uld "raise the leve l of te nsion betwee n th e rival power blocs and w o uld m ak e Spain a m ore likely target in any future co nfl ic t w ith the Sovie t U n io n. "1 11 T hey also arg ued that NATO m em be rshi p wo uld n ot help Spain in its effo rts to rega in Gi bra lt ar , since " it co uld be assum ed th at o the r NATO m em b e rs w ou ld su ppo rt Br ita in o n thi s issue" (" Spain and N ATO ") . In the end, th e most sig nifi can t d o mes tic su p po rt fo r NAT O m e mbe rship cam e from Sp an ish Pr esid e nt Leop oldo So te lo, w ho felt t hat it wa s an ur gent m att er, since he beli e ved "Spain 's e nt ry into NATO w ou ld exp ed ite negotiati ons fo r integrati o n into th e EC " ("S pain a nd NATO ") . T herefore , Spai n , backe d by d o mes tic an d inte rnati onal suppo rt , complet ed th e ratifi cation pro cess a nd was ad mi tted into the organi zatio n in I Y82.
German Reunification and the Inclusion of the Former GDR (1991)
The reunifi cati o n of C en n any on O cto be r 3 , 199 0 , prompted qu esti o ns ov e r ho w , an d w he t he r, th e form e r G D R sho uld be ad mi tted in to NATO. Should it go th rou gh the sam e typ e of ac cessio n pr o cess as Gree ce , T urk ey , the FRG , and Spai n ? O r, sho uld it be ushe red in to N AT O beca use th e FR G, w h ic h alread y belo nge d to the o rgan izatio n , was abso rbing it? T he U S , Fra nce, th e So viet Uni o n , a nd the UK de ter min ed t hat th e reunified Ge rm an state w ou ld be treated " as a co n tin uatio n o f the Fed eral R e pub lic of Cen lla ny (F R G) ; an d th e FR C 's treaty co n un itme nts, in cl ud in g its parti cipati on in N AT O , were affirm ed as contin u ing in effect." !' T w o treaties, th e " T reaty bet w ee n the FRG and th e C crman D em o crati c R epu blic on the E stab lish m ent of Ge rm an U nit y a nd th e T reaty o n the Final Settlem en t Wit h R espect to Germ an y" affin lled that th e fa nne r C D R w o uld Joi n NA T O u nd e r w hat w as pr ev io usl y establi shed by th e FRC (Ack erman 4) . Full German m e m bershi p in N A T O too k place o n M arch 15, 199 1.
STUDY ON NATO ENLARGEMENT
Afte r th e fo rme r GD R entered N AT O , th e Allian ce co nd ucted an d publ ishe d the 199 5 Stud y on NAT O E nla rgement , in o rde r to co nside r " the m e rits o f ad m itt ing ne w memb er s and ho w t hey sho uld be b ro ugh t in ." 12 T he stu dy outli ned ce rtain cr ite ria th at potential N ATO m e mbe r states sh oul d d em onstra te , w hic h were :
afuli 
COII/ ll l i l /I/CII I 10 democratic c;vil -lI l ili lary relations and instu utional structures. (UNA T O E ll l af,R{'//{ct/ I ")
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/7
T o geth er , Allies w ou ld ud u iir n e w m ember states b ased on these c riteria and th eir o ve rall j udgmen r of w he th e r " t h e m embership of a spec ific co u nt ry wo u ld co nt rib u te to sec ur ity and stab ility in th e N orth Atlanrir area ."!' This stu dy sig naled a chan ge in ho w potential m ember states would b e evaluated , sin ce e n t rance cri te ria had n e v er b een so plainl y stated b efore . During th e Cold War, the member states m er el y abided by Arti cle 10 of th e Washingt on Treaty, wh ich "explic itl y stipu late d only on e crite rio n (a Europ ean state) and t wo pro cedural co nd itio n s for admitting n ew member s (a un animous in virario n from th e member states and a dep o sit o f the in strum ent of accession)." !' B y examining NATO's e nlargem ents in 1999 and 200 4 in light of rh e sta nd ards laid o ut in the 1') ')5 St ud y o n NATO Enlargem ent, we can d et ermine how clo sel y th e new m ember states mirrored t he organi zarions n e w crite ria.
THE ACCESSION OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY, AND POLAND (1999)
In Feb ru ar y 19 ')8 , Pr esid ent Clinton remarked to th e Se nate , " T he accessio n o f P ol .m d . Hungary , ,HI d the Czech R epublic to th e N orth Atlantic T reaty O rg.niizati on (N AT O) w ill improv e th e ability of th e United Stares to protect and adva nc e our inter ests in th e rran sarlauri c area" (q u o ted in B cbl cr '15). Clinton' s decision to e nd o rse these p ro spective m em b er state s wa s based o n eac h co u n t ry's st ro ng reputations durin g the 1,),)Os, but did tht'y satisfy th e c ri teria de scribed in th e 1'1')5 Stud y o n Enlargem ent?
In terms of ha ving a fu n ctio n ing d emocratic political system based o n a market economy, all three countri es more than satisfie d this requirem ent pr ior to th e ir admi ssion in 1'1'19. As o f 1998, P oland , Hungary. and the Czech R epublic all "h ad se ve n years o f so lid re cords as stable d em o cra ci es] , .in d sincej 19 89 , Poland an d the Czech R epublic hav e ea ch held three tree parli.uu enta r y electi on s a nd Hungary , t w o ."1, Hun ga r y " u p h old s W estern standa rd s on human rights, freed om o f ex p ressio n , rule o f law , c h ec ks an d balan ce s amo ng bran ch es of government, an d ind ep endent judiciary, and effective lo cal gove r nlnellt,"l l, while th e Czechs e njoyed "the ben efits o f a fully functioning pa rliam curary d em o c racy, including free spe ech, free assembly, and a vigorous , fre e press."!' Lik e wi se, the Polish b ene fite d from free and fair e le ctio ns , a free press, and stro ng go ve rn me nt su p p o rt for hun1~111 righ rs. IB y 19'18 , eac h o f th ese countries was qui ckl y m o ving toward s a free m ark et ec o nomy . Poland WdS admitted to the O rg an izatio n o f Europ ean Coo peration and D e velopm ent (OE C D ) in 19 96 , and since launching econ omic reforms in 19 8 '1, the country 's a nnu al growt h rat e W d S five p ercent ( ,IS o f 1997) (" Pol and 's Record") . The Czech R epublic practi ced tight " fisca l and moneta ry p oli cies, lib e rali zati on of trad e and pnces, and rapid pri vatizat io n of sta re e n te rp rises ].]" but it su ffe re d from trade a nd c ur re nt ac co u n t defic its 111 th e l1lid-1990s ("Czech Repu bli c 's" ) . Hunga ry , lik e Poland , joine d the OECD in 19 % and sh rank its current acco u nt d efi cit to less th an four percent o f its GDP in 19')6 , but it rem ain ed relati v el y h igh in per ca p ita foreign debt ("Hungdry's R ecord") .
With resp ect to th e fair treat m ent o f min ority p opulation s, Hungary. th e Czec h Republic , and Poland " have e lne rged from the yo ke o f com m u nis m . . . [and] made trem endous p ro gress in fosterin g to le ra nce for J e wi sh and o t he r reli gious min oriti es and e t h nic gro u ps .
[Also, property] restitution laws hav e been pa ssed to restore to th eir li ghtful o w ne rs assets stole n by communi st regimes" (" E nJargen H"n t " 20) . These thre e co u n t ries have also demonst rate d a commitm eur to th e p e ac eful resoluti on o f conflicts, which is evident by the fact rhar th e y had no border di sputes leading up to th eir accessio n in 19'19 . Hun gar y has 111-creased co op e rati on w ith its eig ht neighborin g cou ntries. while Polan d " de velo ped pa rticularly stron g ties with Lithu ani a and Ukrain e . o ve rco m ing old tensio ns a nd reac h ing o u t to them with proposals to establish P olish-Lithuanian and Polish-Ukraini an peacekeeping battali ons" (" Po land 's Record") . Like wise, Czech relations with Slo vakia were characte rized as "fund.un eutally so u nd , al tho ug h so me disputes rcm ain led] in vol vin g the Cz ech-Slo vak cu stoms union and residual m att ers ste m m ing from th e January l lilJ3 split o f Czec hoslo vakin " ("Czec h R epubli c's") .
Hungary, the Czech R epubl ic, and Pol an d all had th e ab ility and wil ling ne ss to mak e military co nt ributio ns to NATO operations. It wa s estim ated th at th e three countries wo uld add " 200,000 troops and a range of airfields, ports, and lin es of co mm un icatio n to the Alli an ce 's co llect ive defe nse capabilities" (" E nlarg eme nt " 20) . Also , as of llJ98, " Po land , th e C zec h R epublic , and Hu ngary [were] .. .co nt ribu ting m o re th an 1,000 tro op s to th e N AT O -led mi ssion in Bosnia" (" Enlarge m e nt" 20) . M oreo ver. C ze c hs sho wed th eir allegiance to en fo rcing intern atio nal stability by figh ting w ith th e U S in the Gulf W a r. pa rricipacin g 111 UN peacekeeping m issions, and b eing fo u nd ing m emb e rs of N AT O 's Partne rship for Peace ("Czech Republi c's") . However, it wa s estim ated th at as of 1li98, th e "p ro cess of ge a ring up th e arm ed fo rces fo r full NATO m ember ship [w ould] . . .tak e at least 10 yea rs." I') These three Eu ropean co u ntries also d isplayed th e fifth and fi nal criteri a o u tlin ed in th e 1995 Stu dy o n Enla rgem ent: a co m mi n n e n t to democrat ic civil-military relatio ns an d institu tional structur es. In 19 li7 , Poland m ad e " stead y pro gress to ward th e estab lishm e nt o f effectiv e civilian control and parliamentary ov e rsight of th e mil itary alo ng W estern lin es" ("PoLm u 's R ecord") . An other notable fact is that the Poli sh h ave an even hi g he r regard for th eir armed forc es th an for th e Roman Ca th olic Church .:" In the Czech R epublic, the Presid en t act s as Co m ma nd e r-in-C hief and the parliam ent has bee n a "po w erful player. .. in qu estionin g th e sco pe and directi on o f th e govern m c nt 's militar y restructurin g plans and pr oposed defen se bu dget s" (" C zec h R epubli c's"). Hungar y co ntro ls its m ilita ry through its co nstitutio nal parliam enrary system , w hi ch gi ves th em "co ntro l o f th e m ilitary budget . stru cture , deployment fi elding, stationing, and se nio r lead ersh ip" (" H u ngary 's R ecord "). Inter estin gly, like th e P olish, the "Czech an d Hungarian armi es. . .[also enj o yed] in their respecti ve co u ntries m o re trust than th e leadin g civilian ins titutio ns" (Bebl e r 55). Based o n st ro ng publi c su pport fo r th e military , civil-mi litary relati ons see m ed to b e quite go od th rou gh out Poland, th e C zec h R epubl ic. and Hunga ry , w hi c h m ad e th em eve n m ore attra cti ve as potential NATO m ember states. Th ese three states recei ved high m arks in sarisfYi ng th e c riteria for NATO membership afte r the Cold W a r, w hich led to t he ir e ve nt ual accession in 1995J. 21 THE ACCESSION OF ROMANIA, BULGARIA, ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, SLOVENIA, AND SLO-
VAKIA (2004)
P oland, th e C zec h Republic , and Hungary were m ore than q ua lified to be com e NATO member stat es base d on th e ad m issio n criteri a o utlined in th e 199 5 Stu dy o n Enlargem ent . How ever , th e states that en tered In 2004 adher ed f~ll-IeSS clo sely to th e criteria .'2 All se ve n pro sp ecti ve member states we re dem ocr acies (to varying deg rees) that had . or w e re establish ing, free m ar ket eco nomies . In parti cul ar, Slo ve nia wa s recognized for its " stab le politi cal and eco no m ic e nv iro n m e n t th at so me o f th e o the r NATO invitee s [did] Bul gari a co nrinue jd ] to sutl er from co rru ptio n in th eir go ve m ing structur es."e; A s for Slovakia, the " m arkc rizario n of. ., [it s] eco no my has been relat ively succ essfu l].]" but th e co u urry h;I S "fared w o rse economi cally th an th e Czech Re public ." eb In terms o f tre atm ent o f its m in o rit y populations, B ulgaria had 1I 0t "experi enced ;lny sign ific ant et hnic co nflicrsj.] althou gh th e soc ial a nd econ o m ic positio n o f th e large R om a m in ority remain a po inr o f co nc ern " (Bugajsk i 3). Sim ilarly , R o ni aui a Iu s ge ne rally ex perie n ced stabl e relatio ns with its minority popu lations, but it has expe rien ced som e disputes with the H un garian m in o rity an d R o ni a m in orit y, w h ich "will req Ulre m ore intensive gove rnm en tal and int ern ati onal in vol vcm eur" (B ug ajs ki 4). R omani a and Bu lg;lria have also demo nstrated th eir commitment to th e pea cefu l resoluti o n o f co nflic ts and de m o crati c civiJmilitary relati on s and institutional stru ctur es. B ulgaria "m aintains good relati o ns w it h all of its neighbo rs and has no o utstand ing dispur esj.j 'twhil e R omania has been a part of pea cekeeping mi ssions, regional sec ur ity ini tiatives, and pla yed a "s tab ilizing rol e across seve ral regions, in clu ding South East Eu rope and th e Black Sea zo ne " (B ugajs ki 4 , 5) , M oreo ver, R oma nia e njoys fuJJ civilian co n trol over its military, w h ile Bulgar ia is in th e process o f co nso lid ating demo crat ic . civ ilian co n tro l of its armed forces (B ugaj sk i 3-4) , With respect to t heir w illingn ess to m ak e military co n t rib utio ns to N AT O , th e se ve n pr os pective member co u nt ries h ad already dem o nstrated "enthusiasm and w illingness to co ntribute to NATO-l ed operati ons in th e Balka ns, O p e ratio n Enduring Freedom, and ISAF [(Internati onal Sec u rity Assistance Fo rce)] ." 27 Slove ni a and Slov a kia w e re undergoin g military refo rm prograllls to p rep ;tre themselves fo r entry into N ATO, and altho ug h " Slo vakia is expe riencing m an y of the ' no rm al' p robl ems asso ciat ed with suc h a com plex endeavo r, their stra tegy is reali stic" (Sim o n 6). Lik e wi se , Bul garia has m ad e substan tial progress "i n th e restru ctnri ng of th e arm ed forces int o ;t modern and co m bar-readv m ilitary tailored to NATO n eed s" (Bu gaj ski 3). E stonia, Lat via, and Lithuania " have been wi lling' to suppo rt the U.S . and NATO farth e r afield , and are likely to se rio usly fo cu s o n d e vel oping N ATO niclu: d efen se capabilities w ith t he U. S. and Poland" (Sim o n 5). Regarding Romania. it has wo rked w ith th e United Stat es to d evelop " m ilitary con tac ts. throu gh j o in t exe rcises, ed ucatio nal progr;tnls, and an ns co nt rac ts " . [w hic h illustrates that R om ania is] becoming inc reasing ly interope rable With NATO and w ith Am er ican for ces" (B ugaj ski 5) , Although th ese co u n tries clearl y illustrated th eir w illingness to m ake military co ntributio ns to NAT O , du e to t hei r sm all size and limited resources, th er e was und erlyin g sen tim e nt th at the " se ven new m embers' p hysical an d institu tio nal capac it ies [w er e] .. .substant ially wcaleer tha n Po la nd , H un gary , and the Czech Repuhli c[,]"whi ch wo uld tr anslate into " m odes t con tribu tio ns to A lliance d efen se . [b ut] prov ide valuab le politi cal and straregi c su ppo rt to th e U n ited State s in th e adv ance m e nt of [its] . .. in terests in Europe .. .and h elp bridge th e transatl anti c gap" (Sim o n 3, 7) . H arsher c ritics wen t so t n as say ing tha t th e ne w m ember states wo uld "[ n je ith er in quali ty nor qu antity" .m ak e a substanti ve differen ce in N ATO 's military poten tial.":" T h is led SOllie to vie w th e 2004 acce ssio n w ith " lowered , more so be r and realistic ex pectatio ns" (Sim o n 4). N onetheless, th e m ember stares un arumously ag reed to ;tccep t Est oni a, Latvi a, Lithuania, R omania , Bu lgaria, Slov ak ia, and Slove nia into the o rgan izatio n o n March 29, 2004 ,
THE ACCESSION PROCESS FOR THE ENLARGEMENTS OF 1999 AND 2004
Al th ou gh it can he di sputed how well th e m embe r sta tes in N ATO' s fifth ro u nd of eulargcmeur ad he red to the c rite ria laid o u t in th e 199 5 Stu dy 0 11 Enla rgemeut. the .icc essio n pr o cesses for th e fourth and fifth ro u nd s we re quite sun ilar. First. th e p ro sp ecti ve sta tes were inv ited to accessio n talks at NATO h ea d qu art e rs in Bru ssel s. Aft er th ese talks, th e invitees se nt letter s o f intent to join NAT O , a lo n g wit h J tim etable o u tlini ng w he n th e y exp ect ed to fin ish reforms that were suggested d uring the access io n talks. So me o f th ese reforms re vol ved around target force goal s (T FG) th at th e su p reme allied co m m ande r in Euro pe (SACEU R) set in response to a d efen se planning qu esti onnaire (D P Q) that eac h state co m ple ted d u ri ng th e accession process. " In th e third ste p , each invitee sigll ed an accessio n pro to col that allowe d the invited countri es to be wri tte n into the Washington Treat y. Th e fo u rt h ste p occ urre d w he n the NATO m emb e r co u ntries ratified the accession pro to c ol s. III th e fifth ste p, NATO 's Secre tary G en er al in vit ed th e potential new member states to ac ced e to th e N orth Atl anti c Trea ty." Aft er th e in vitees ac ceded to th e North Atlantic Treat y, th ey d ep o sit ed th eir in struments o f accessio n w it h th e U S Sta te D epartment, w hic h m ad e th em fo rma l m embers o f N ATO (" NATO Enlar gemeut ") .
Th e o nly difference betw een th e p ro cess in 10 99 a nd t he p ro cess in 20 04 , wa s t hat th e se ve n m ember co u n tries that joine d ill 2004 had parti cipated in th e M embershi p Ac ti on Plan (MA P) JI The MAP , w hic h began ill 19 S1Sl . w as c reate d to " he lp cou n trie s aspiring to NATO m embership In their preparati o ns " (" E nhan cing Senility " 7). E ach o f th e seve n states th at joine d NATO in 20 04 enrolled in th is p ro gr am , w hic h incl ude d " bo t h p oliti cal and technical advice, JS well as annual m eetings b et w een all NATO m emb er s a nd ind iv id ua l aspira n ts" (" E n hancin g Security" 7). Althou gh thi s is not officially p;Jrt of th e acce ssion proce ss, th er e is 110 doubt that the MA P pr o gram helped the seven aspirant co u n tr ies pr ep ar e for NATO membership,
COMPARING ACCESSION CRITERIA
Alth ou gh th e e nd of th e Cold W ar sig nale d a chan gc 1I1 global sec uri ty stra tegy , th e criteri a used to d etermine p erspecti ve NATO m ember states has rem ain ed relati vel y co nstant. Sc holar M ark Smith notes th at joi n ing : (Smith 176) Sm ith 's words still ring true to day . w h ic h is evident h y exam ining the cri teria d esc ribe d 111 the 1Sl95 Study o n Enl arg em ent. The belief In a functi oning d emo cr ati c p o lit ical system based on a mark et econo my , th e ( Ii I' tr eatment of minority populations, th e pea ceful resolut io n o f conflict s, and a co m m itm e n t to democratic civil-military relati ons and in stituti on al st ructu res are all n ot ion s e ngrained in Western ideology. While th e y w ere not explicitl y li sted ;IS c rite ria durin g the C o ld W ar , th e y were certainl y co rne rstones of th e types o f Wes te rn d em ocra ci es that NATO so ugh t to attra ct . As for th e ability and wi llingne ss to m ak e a military con tri b u tio n to N ATO o pe ratio ns, thi s w as clea rly J co ns id e ratio n during Co ld Wa r e nl arge me n t (alt ho ugh less so in the c ase o f Gre ece). sin ce NATO wou ld ha ve http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/7 d iffic ulty o perating as a successfu l sec urity o rg an izat io n with out stro ng and lo yal mili tary participati on. Th ere fore, th e 1<, ) 95 Stu dy on Enlargem ent see ms to have be en a m od em an d co ntem po rary attempt at definin g key criteria fo r potenrial NATO m ember stat es that , at leas t in essen ce , ha d been adh ered to during C old W ar expansion.
As d em onstr at ed e arlier, th e co u n tries accepted into NATO In 199 9 were ex cellent exa m ple s of states that satisfie d the ne w e n larg e m ent c rite ria. H o w e ver, th e state s th at acce d ed in 2004 fell rather sho rt o f fulfillin g th e c rite ria, espec ially w he n it cam e to each co u ntry's ability to m ake milita ry co ntrib ut io ns to N ATO . Althou gh th is see m s lik e th e m ain crite ria for NATO membership (o r membership in any se cu rity o rga niza tio n) , th e mi lita ry benefits o f ad d ing th ese countri es pal ed in comparison to the 19 9 9 accession stat es. In o rd e r to ex plain th e 2004 accessio n s, I wo u ld e m p ha size that NATO' s und erlying criter ia for pe rsp ecti ve m ember states is th at th e y co n tri b u te to th e "secu ri ty and stab ility in th e N o rt h Atl anti c area" ("E n ha ncin g Security" 6) . Wh ile th eir military cont rib u tio ns m ake be w ea k, their comrnirm cnr to pea ce an d d emocracy h elp s sta bilize th e pot enti ally unstabl e regi ons o f Central and E astern Europe. f o r an o rgan ization th at has expand ed fronl tw el ve to tw e nt ysix particip ants, NATO mi ght have realized th at it is just as ben e ficial to invite countri es that p rom ote sec ur ity throu gh th e p ractice of co mm o n political and id eological beli efs, rather than throu gh th e number o f act ua l fo rces th at th e y co n tri b u te . T hi s m ay prove to be more important w it h fu t ure en largem e n ts, as th e numbe r of states th at ex e m plify th e 199 5 cr ite ria see ms to be w ani ng.
COMPARING THE ACCESSION PROCESS
Alth ou gh ac cessio n d ec isions made du rin g th e Cold W ar foll owed the outline in the No rt h A tlan tic Treaty and were care fu lly plann ed , debated , and ag re ed upon unanim ously b y ,III m em ber states, po st-C ol d W ar accessio ns have foll o w ed a mo re st ru ct ured ap p ro ach . The p ro cess d u rin g th e C o ld W ar was largel y influ en ced by NATO 's st ro nge st pla yer, th e United States, w h ic h ofte n fo u nd itsclf lobb yiu g fo r e nl arge m e n t . This is less appa re nt tod ay, as m or e of th e weight is placed on aspirin g m ember countri es th at are subj ect to va ryi ng reform s (like th e MAP) be fo re beginning ac cessio n talks. The MAP almost ac ts as ,I prelimina ry ste p i n the accession pro cess, w hich is a sig n that NATO m embership is beco m in g in c reasin gly deliberate . While so m e m ay view a stri ct e r and m o re stru ct u red pro cess as a hin d ran ce to fu t ure enlarge me nt, I tend to side with Sm ith , w ho states, " [N AT O ] is still an allian ce o f choice , but th e responsibil ity o f the All ian ce to c hoose wisel y is m ore important than it has ev er bee n ." .J2 While cri teria for membe rship lIlay be lo o se n in g sin ce the C old W ar, th e more str inge n t accession p ro cess places a gr eat e r focus on inv itin g co u n tri es th at w ill co n tin ue to u ph ol d th e g oa ls o f th e Alliance in th e f uture. How e ver, th ese goals se e m to be cha ngi ng as NAT O places less e m p hasis on pe rsp e ctive mem b er states for their m ilita ry contrib u t ions, and m ore e m pha sis o n shared id eol o gi es. T he re is no d oubt th at thi s will imp act N AT O in th e fu t ure, ,IS it m o ves further and furth e r aw ay h om its o rigi ns as ,I military organ izatio n. I rel y h ea v ily o n Smi t h's a nalysis for th e fir st part o f thi s pap er, since it is o ne o f th e best. an d few, so urces on NAT O e xpansio n duri ng th e Cold War .
2 . Sm ith 25. The "Washington Pap er " wa s actually cr aft ed by a Working Grou p CO I11-
